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ABSTRACT. This Note offers a new framework to evaluate judicial deference in cases
reviewing government actions during national emergencies. Rejecting the conventional approach
assessing deference as a matter of degree or as a condition present or not present, this Note offers
a nuanced framework to evaluate deference that considers both degree and form. It identifies two
forms of deference: perception deference as an independent decision not to reach an independent
conclusion concerning whether and to what extent a threat exists, where the decision is
expressed through the adoption of government decisionmakers' conclusions, and means
deference as an independent decision not to reach an independent conclusion concerning the
proper means to respond to the perceived threat, where the decision is expressed through the
adoption of government decisionmakers' conclusions. Applying this framework to the Japanese-
American cases, this Note concludes the Supreme Court exercised little perception deference and
complete means deference, a finding with important implications for four prominent scholarly
debates.
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INTRODUCTION
The judicial role in reviewing governmental actions taken in response to
national emergencies is descriptively complex and normatively controversial.
Descriptively, these cases are difficult. National emergencies1 require courts to
balance two competing interests: civil liberties 2 and national security.' Aharon
Barak, the former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, describes the
tension individual judges experience:
It is hard to be a judge. It is even harder to be a good and worthy judge.
It is sevenfold harder to be a good and worthy judge in a democracy
under terror . . . [B]ecause when terror strikes a democracy, the
tension between the needs of the community and the liberty of the
individual reaches its peak.4
Normatively, the judiciary's proper role is controversial. Scholars have long
disagreed about whether and to what extent Cicero's maxim that "[w]hen arms
speak, the laws are silent"' should be true.6 In short, the judiciary must
navigate a careful course between lawlessness 7 and national suicide8 to
1. When this Note references "national emergencies," it references war and terrorist attacks
because they pose a political challenge to the sovereign authority of the United States over
its territory. See BRUCE AcKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 43-44 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1029, 1035-36 (2004) [hereinafter Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution].
2. Within this Note, civil liberties reference all aspects of law, including the Constitution,
statutes, regulations, and judicial interpretations, that affect individual freedom. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 149 (2006).
3. See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 291, 310 (2006).
4. Id. at 310.
5. CICERO, On Behalf of Milo, in THE SPEECHES 7, 17 (N.H. Watts trans., rev. ed. 1953).
6. Compare WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
224-25 (1998) ("It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as
favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime."), with Owen Fiss, Law Is Everywhere,
117 YALE L.J. 256, 259 (2007) ("The governing assumption of American society is that these
war measures will be undertaken within the terms of the Constitution . . . .Ours is a
Constitution for times of war as well as times of peace.").
7. See BARA, supra note 3, at 305 (stating that judges must ensure the government fights
terrorism legally and constitutionally within the framework of the law); Cf. Harold Hongju
Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 23, 29 (2002) (arguing that human rights law
must constrain the government's use of force in the war on terrorism).




accommodate national security needs within a framework that also preserves
fundamental civil liberties. Deference, 9 if used properly, may be a helpful tool
in reaching the proper balance.' °
The question of how the Supreme Court has historically accommodated
civil liberties and national security in emergency situations has received
heightened attention in recent years because of the ongoing threat of
terrorism." Nevertheless, the terrorist threats are not the first national
emergency the United States has had to face.' 2 As the United States
prospectively considers how to balance civil liberties and security in
confronting the terrorist threat, the country should consider how it has
historically done so. The Japanese-American cases from the Second World
War'3 provide helpful lessons about how the Court balanced these interests and
have important implications for modern debates about the balance the
Supreme Court should strike in reviewing government actions responding to
future national emergencies.
This Note offers a new framework for understanding the practice of
judicial deference in national emergency contexts and applies the proposed
9. In Section II.A., this Note defines judicial deference as an independent decision not to reach
an independent conclusion interpreting a set of facts presented to a court expressed through
the adoption of another decisionmaker's conclusion.
10. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells, 69
Mo. L. REV. 959, 970 (2004) ("Subject to the 'political question' exception..., I agree with
the Court's general approach of deferentially reviewing the executive's military actions. In
this uniquely delicate context, room must be allowed for judges to make a sophisticated
legal and political calculus based on the facts and nuances of each case."); cf. Eric A. Posner
& Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1198 (2007)
(suggesting that giving the executive deference in foreign relations law is normatively
appropriate).
ii. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment
in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307, 310 (2006) ("The comparisons of
terrorism detentions and the [Japanese] internment are compelling and the subject of much
scholarly discourse."); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1933, 1934
(2003) ("Since September 11, Korematsu and its associations have figured prominently in
public debate about the proper scope of antiterrorism efforts."); Suzanna Sherry, Judges of
Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 793, 8o8 (2003) ("Indeed, I would not be at all surprised
if Korematsu ends up being cited with approval by the Supreme Court some time during the
current war on terrorism.").
12. David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of
Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2565, 2587-88 (2003) ("The United States has been under one state
of emergency or another since 1933.").
13. The Japanese-American cases considered in this Note are Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943)-
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framework to the Japanese-American cases. While these cases have long
commanded scholars' attention, 4 the practice of judicial deference in these
cases remains fundamentally misunderstood. Eugene V. Rostow's argument
that the Supreme Court did not critically review the factual basis for the
military's decisions'" and completely deferred to the military'6 has become the
baseline of modern scholarship. Since Rostow's critique, scholars have not
seriously challenged this position's accuracy.'
7
Nevertheless, Rostow misunderstood the Japanese-American cases. He
made a series of questionable assumptions that raise serious concerns about the
line of scholarship attempting to identify the Japanese-American cases' lessons
for today's problems. First, Rostow gave too much weight to Korematsu v.
United States, one of the most despised decisions in American history.'8 While
Korematsu seems "obviously wrong,"' 9 scholars often forget Ex parte Endo,2°
14. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases -A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 492
(1945) (criticizing the Japanese-American cases).
15. Id. at 531.
16. Id. at 503 ("In a bewildering and unimpressive series of opinions ... the Court chose to
assume that the main issue of the cases -the scope and method of judicial review of military
decisions-did not exist.").
17. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:
Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1OOO (1999); Geoffrey
R. Stone, National Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2203, 2203 (2007); Christina E.
Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REv. 903, 903-04 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, The
Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1056 (2005)
(book review) (arguing that the Supreme Court "has famously folded up its tent and run for
cover rather than protect civil liberties" during times of war and citing Korematsu in
support); cf. Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency
Powers: The United States' Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 296, 311 (2004) ("The decision [Korematsu] is thought to offer numerous lessons
about the inability of courts during wartime to provide any check on political excesses,
particularly those jointly endorsed by the executive and legislature."); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of
Political Faqfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 16ol (2006) (arguing that national emergencies
promote deference to the executive branch); David Cole, No Reason To Believe: Radical
Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1329
(2008) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMUELE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007)) ("Most observers of American history look
back with regret and shame on our nation's record of respecting civil liberties in times of
crisis.").
18. See Gudridge, supra note i1, at 1937-39. By 2002, eight of the nine sitting Supreme Court
Justices had openly criticized Korematsu as wrongly decided. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens,
54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 993 (2002).
1g. Gudridge, supra note 11, at 1933.
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decided the very same day as Korematsu, where the Supreme Court held that
interning Japanese-Americans known to be loyal was unlawfiul.2" Giving due
consideration to Endo complicates the scholar's task of interpreting the
Supreme Court's war jurisprudence. But to ignore Endo is to ignore a case
every bit as important to the Supreme Court's war jurisprudence as Hirabayashi
and Korematsu.
Second, Rostow made a critical oversight in the application of his
conception of deference to the Japanese-American cases. He seems to have
assumed that the outcomes in the Japanese-American cases were so invidious
that they could only be the product of deference. He wrote:
If the Court had stepped forward in bold heart to vindicate the law and
declare the entire program illegal, the episode would have been passed
over as a national scandal, but a temporary one altogether capable of
reparation. . . [The Supreme Court] has upheld an act of military
power without a factual record in which the justification for the act was
analyzed.'
By thus limiting the choices either to deferring to the military without
demanding a factual record, or not deferring and necessarily striking down the
government's policies, Rostow overlooked a third possible choice: not
deferring, but ultimately agreeing with the military. In short, Rostow assumed
that agreement with another decisionmaker's interpretation necessarily means
deference occurs. That assumption is logically wrong.23 As this Note argues,
the choice Rostow overlooked is the most accurate account.
Third and most importantly, Rostow misconceived what deference is. He
incorrectly assumed deference is monolithic and can only exist as a condition
present or not present when reviewing government decisionmakers' overall
policy choices of curfew, 4 exclusion, 5 and internment6 to respond to a
ao. See id. at 1934.
21. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302-04 (1944) (ordering the unconditional release of Japanese-
Americans known to be loyal from internment camps).
22. Rostow, supra note 14, at 491.
23. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. io6i, 1075 (2008).
24. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943) (upholding the government's curfew
policy for Japanese-Americans in designated military areas on the West Coast).
25. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (upholding the government's decision
to exclude Japanese-Americans from the West Coast).
26. Endo, 323 U.S. at 297 (striking down the government's decision to intern Japanese-
Americans known to be loyal).
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perceived threat of espionage and sabotage by Japanese-Americans on the West
Coast. 27 Such an assumption underestimates the complexity and fluidity of the
ways in which judges may defer to another decisionmaker's decision.
Judicial deference is an independent decision not to reach an independent
conclusion interpreting a set of facts presented to a court, where the decision is
expressed through the adoption of another decisionmaker's conclusion. To
evaluate judicial deference precisely, scholars must evaluate judicial deference
as a matter of degree and form. The degree inquiry consists of evaluating
where on a scale from low to high deference a decision falls. This inquiry is
common. 29 However, there is more to deference than its degree. The form
inquiry considers the different aspects of decisionmaking reviewed in a
particular case. It considers the manner in which a judge does and does not
defer. It thus fills a void in existing scholarly accounts of deference.
This Note identifies two forms of deference. The first is perception
deference, defined as acceptance without critical review of government
decisionmakers' judgments about whether and to what extent a threat exists.
The second is means deference, defined as acceptance without critical review of
government decisionmakers' judgments about the proper means to respond to
the perceived threat. By adding the degree inquiry to these two forms of
deference, this model anticipates an infinite number of degrees of perception
and means deference. Very few correlations exist between the two degrees.
A helpful model to visualize the forms of judicial deference is a graph with
"perception deference" as the x-axis and "means deference" as the y-axis. The
further along either axis a point is, the greater the degree of deference. When a
court reviews a government decisionmaker's actions responding to a national
emergency, some point within the first quadrant represents the correct degree
of deference given to each aspect of the decisionmaker's decision.
Judicial deference existed in different degrees in the Japanese-American
cases depending on the form of the Supreme Court's inquiry into the
government's policy choices of curfew,3" exclusion,3' and internment.32 Even
27. See Rostow, supra note 14, at 503 (suggesting that the Court categorically deferred to
government decisionmakers in the Japanese-American cases).
28. For a more in-depth discussion, see infra Section II.A.
29. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv.
605, 608-09 (2003) (stating that judicial deference to the executive during emergencies
exists as a matter of degree); Robert J. Purshaw, Jr., The "Enemy Combatant" Cases in
Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1005, 1046-47 (2007) ("The degree of deference to the executive [by the Supreme Court]
ebbs and flows....").
30. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943).
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though a high degree of means deference existed in Hirabayashi and Korematsu,
the Supreme Court exercised little perception deference in the Japanese-
American Cases. Contrary to Rostow's position, the Supreme Court did not
completely substitute the government's judgment for its own. Although the
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the government's perception of a threat
from disloyal Japanese-Americans in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, it reached that
conclusion independently. It made its own decision interpreting the
significance of the facts before it. This finding is at odds with the conventional
understanding of the Japanese-American cases.33
This reassessment of judicial deference's role has implications for four
ongoing debates that have recently generated controversy because of the threat
of terrorism: (1) whether the Supreme Court correctly decided the Japanese-
American cases, (2) general criticisms of judicial deference, (3) how the
Supreme Court historically balances civil liberties and security during national
emergencies, and (4) whether and how to accommodate extraordinary
situations under the Constitution. While not definitively resolving any of the
four debates, the conclusion reached highlights the extent to which meaningful
progress in these debates requires adopting a more nuanced understanding of
judicial deference.
Part I briefly discusses the background of the Japanese-American cases,
including their factual context and holdings. In Part II, this Note applies a new
framework to assess judicial deference to the Japanese-American cases. An
evaluation of the implications of the conclusion reached for four current
debates follows in Part III. The Conclusion briefly discusses the necessary
parameters to ensure that normative prescriptions of the Japanese-American
cases' lessons rest on a sound foundation.
31. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944).
32. ExparteEndo, 323 U.S. 283, 304 (1944).
33. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 14, at 519-20; Solove, supra note 17, at 943; Wells, supra note 17,
at 903-04; cf Gross, supra note 17, at 1034 (arguing that courts have systematically reviewed
government actions and decisions with "a highly deferential attitude" during national
emergencies).
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I. HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CASES
In popular imagination, the Japanese-American cases are infamous.
34
Nevertheless, their infamy should not excuse failing to understand precisely
what happened. The stakes are too high." A careful examination of their
factual context and particular holdings provides an important backdrop to the
discussion in Parts II and III by revealing that the record that reached the
Supreme Court, however distorted it was, 6 did not mandate the outcomes.
The Supreme Court had sufficient information to form an independent
conclusion concerning the relationship between Japanese ancestry and
disloyalty in war. As Part II demonstrates, that is precisely what the Court did.
A. Background of the Japanese-American Cases
After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war
against Japan on December 8, 1941.37 Soon thereafter, military and executive
officials began preparing a strategy to protect national security. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19,
1942, authorizing the Secretary of War and designated military commanders to
create zones in which military officials could restrict civilian movement and
expel civilians.3 9 After the Secretary of War designated Lieutenant General J. L.
DeWitt as Military Commander of the Western Defense Command pursuant
34. Cf. Cole, supra note 18, at 993 (noting that eight sitting Supreme Court Justices had said
Korematsu was wrongly decided by 2002); Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases
and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U.
HAW. L. REV. 649, 65o (1997) ("This disregard for constitutional rights, justified at the time
by claims of military necessity, and upheld by the Supreme Court, is now universally
condemned."); Gudridge, supra note 11, at 1933 (stating that Korematsu "now seems so
obviously wrong"); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in
Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273, 296 ("Korematsu seems now to be regarded almost
universally as wrongly decided."); Elbert Lin, Case Comment, Korematsu Continued.. ., 112
YALE L.J. 1911, 1916 (2003) (calling Korematsu "widely despised").
35. Cf. Stone, supra note 17, at 2205 (suggesting that the internment of Japanese-Americans was
the "critical civil liberties issue in World War II").
36. Scholars agree that the government deliberately withheld important evidence from the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 217-18 (1983); Eric K. Yamamoto,
Korematsu Revisited - Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax
Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil
Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 16 (1986).
37. Act of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (declaring war on Japan).
38. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85-86 (1943).
39. See id. (citing Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)).
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to Executive Order No. 9066,40 General DeWitt issued a series of public
proclamations establishing military zones in strategically important areas on
the West Coast and asserting authority to expel persons from those areas as
necessary.4 1
Meanwhile, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9102 on March 18,
1942, which created the War Relocation Authority and vested it with authority
to remove and resettle persons excluded by military officials pursuant to
Executive Order No. 9066.42 On March 21, 1942, Congress ratified and
confirmed Executive Order No. 9066,4 3 which authorized criminal penalties
for persons disobeying exclusion orders. 4 General DeWitt issued Public
Proclamation No. 3 on March 24, 1942, which established a curfew for all
persons of Japanese ancestry requiring them to be in their homes between
8:oo p.m. and 6:oo a.m. every night.4 Throughout the spring, General
DeWitt issued a series of orders excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry
from designated military areas on the West Coast.4 6 The exclusion orders
eventually resulted in their resettlement in internment camps. 47 Officially, the
purpose of internment camps was to discern loyal and disloyal Japanese-
Americans, and eventually free loyal Japanese-Americans. 48 However, even
after public officials had determined that Japanese-Americans were loyal, they
could not leave the internment camps when public officials determined that
communities were hostile to Japanese-Americans. 49 Their confinement had no
definite end."0
Some scholars have strongly suggested that legitimate military concerns
may have been a pretext to disguise invidious motives. The most commonly
cited invidious motive is racism."1 Rostow argued that the wartime treatment
40. See id. at 86.
41. See id. at 86-87; Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 286-87 (1944).
42. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 87 (citing Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (March 20,
1942)).
43. Endo, 323 U.S. at 287 (citing Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Star. 173 (1942)).
44. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 87-88 (citing Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942)).
45. See id. at 88 (citing Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Mar. 24, 1942)).
46. See id. at 88-89.
47. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 289.
48. See id. at 291.
49. See id. at 293.
so. See Rostow, supra note 14, at 496.
51. See id. at 489; Tushnet, supra note 34, at 288; Alfred C. Yen, Praising with Faint Damnation -
The Troubling Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 4o B.C. L. REv. 1, 1 (1998).
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of Japanese-Americans was not justifiable by military necessity, but rather was
"calculated to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social
maladjustments of a cumulative and sinister kind. ' s2 While scholars continue
to debate whether public officials reasonably feared a Japanese invasion when
devising the policies, 3 it now seems clear that hysteria to some degree
promoted unreasonable perceptions of risk 4 fed by racial prejudice and
animus."
In addition, Rostow argued that perceiving a threat of espionage and
sabotage by Japanese-Americans is inherently racist because it assumes that a
group characteristic -ethnic ancestry-is probative evidence of loyalty. s6
Rostow rejected the proffered security concerns because public officials had
already arrested many allegedly disloyal Japanese-Americans immediately after
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, s7 no actual proven events of sabotage by
Japanese-Americans had occurred before public officials expelled Japanese-
Americans from the West Coast, 8 a suspicious five-month time gap occurred
between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the exclusion orders, 9 and public
officials largely allowed Japanese-Americans residing in Hawaii to live in peace
even though Hawaii was in greater danger of attack.6' Having rejected the
proffered security concerns for these reasons, Rostow argued that racism was
the only convincing explanation of the government's policies.1
While Rostow offers a strong argument, the evidence he accumulates and
the fact that he made the argument within a year of Korematsu and Endo62
actually undermines his deference argument. His ability to make such an
argument so close in time to the decisions shows that the Supreme Court could
52. See Rostow, supra note 14, at 489.
53. Compare REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 211 (arguing that at the time the internment program
was put into effect, the fear of the Japanese invading the West Coast was real), with Rostow,
supra note 14, at 496 ("The dominant factor in the development of [the internment and
exclusion] policy was not a military estimate of a military problem, but familiar West Coast
attitudes of race prejudice.").
S4. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 17, at 310.
55. See Wells, supra note 17, at 909.
S6. See Rostow, supra note 14, at 492, 495-96.
57. See id. at 492, 496.
58. See id. at 496.
59. See id. at 507.
6o. See id. at 494.
61. See id. at 496-97; 532-33.
62. The Yale Law Journal published Rostow's article in June 1945 and the Supreme Court
decided Korematsu and Ex parte Endo in December 1944.
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have reached the same conclusion in these cases. The core underlying facts
were not a secret. For instance, the briefs filed in these cases discussed very
similar facts to those cited by Rostow 63 and presented very similar
arguments. 6' Therefore, the Supreme Court had sufficient facts to strike down
the government's policies. Because it had sufficient facts, the manner in which
63. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 71, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22)
(noting that the government had not charged even one Japanese-American on the Hawaiian
Islands with an act of disloyalty) [hereinafter Korematsu Brief for Appellant]; Brief of
Japanese American Citizens League, Amicus Curiae at 3, Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (No. 22)
(arguing that abundant, reliable information existed to prove Japanese-Americans were well
assimilated and loyal when the government expelled Japanese-Americans); id. at 84-85
(noting the time gap between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the exclusion of
Japanese-Americans from the West Coast); Brief for Appellant at 6, Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (No. 870) (noting that the government had not brought any
charge of espionage, sabotage, or treasonable activity against any Japanese-American at the
time it expelled Japanese-Americans from designated areas) [hereinafter Hirabayashi Brief
for Appellant]; Brief for Northern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union,
Amicus Curiae at 73-74, Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81 (No. 870) (arguing that no geographic
theater of war existed on the West Coast and that enemies did not threaten American soil).
64. Opening Brief for Appellant at 31, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (No. 70) ("The
existence of a state of war does not suspend constitutional rights."); Korematsu Brief for
Appellant, supra note 63, at 11 ("Behind the mask of artificially created war-hysteria anti-
Oriental pressure groups carried on their machinations designed to result in the deportation
of these people."); id. at 56 (arguing that prejudice motivated the military's policies toward
Japanese-Americans on the West Coast); Brief of Japanese American Citizens League, supra
note 63, at 3 ("Evacuation was not a military necessity but was due to false reports of
sabotage in Hawaii, to the activities of anti-oriental pressure groups and unscrupulous
competitors; and most important of all to the admitted race prejudice of the Commanding
General who issued the evacuation orders."); id. at 197 ("We contend that General DeWitt
accepted the views of racists instead of the principles of democracy because he is himself a
confessed racist."); Hirabayashi Brief for Appellant, supra note 63, at 15 ("Whatever the
measures that war might justify, the wholesale attribution of disloyalty to a racial group of
citizens by mere military order cannot, under the Constitution, be one of them."); id. at 19
("If it be argued that war creates special problems the answer must always be that they must
be solved under the Constitution. However great the emergency, its provisions control. At
least such must be the answer in this Court."); id. at 21 ("Often the question has been raised
whether this country could wage a new war without loss of its fundamental liberties at
home. Here is one occasion for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that question
and show the world that we can fight for democracy and preserve it too."); Brief for
Northern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 63, at 74-75
("What the military power has attempted to do [on the West Coast], however, is to set up
an unauthorized limited military government or a limited provisional government over a
segment of our civilian population on a race discrimination basis .... "); id. at 81 ("Loyalty
to the government cannot be determined along ethnic lines."); id. at 104 (arguing that
political pressure groups used war merely as a pretext to justify the expulsion of Japanese-
Americans from the West Coast).
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the Supreme Court deferred and did not defer to the government was decisive
to the cases' outcomes. 6s
B. Holdings of the Japanese-American Cases
In Hirabayashi, the first major Japanese-American case, the Supreme Court
upheld the curfew orders placed on Japanese-Americans residing in military
areas.66 Hirabayashi, an American citizen,67 knowingly violated the curfew
covering his residence. 68  The Supreme Court considered two issues
surrounding his conviction: whether Congress unconstitutionally delegated its
power on March 21, 1942, by confirming Executive Order No. 9066, and
whether the curfew violated the Fifth Amendment.6 9 After reviewing the series
of authorizations Congress and President Roosevelt gave to military officials to
establish restrictions for persons living in military areas, the Supreme Court
held that Congress authorized the government to create an enforceable curfew
policy."0 Regarding the delegation challenge, the Supreme Court held that
Congress and President Roosevelt acting together had the power to designate
military commanders with powers to issue restrictions on civilians within the
military areas71 and, therefore, no unlawful delegation occurred. 72 While the
Supreme Court acknowledged the odiousness of treating citizens differently
based solely on ethnic ancestry, it nevertheless upheld the curfew orders
65. The government deliberately withheld from the Supreme Court facts and interpretations of
facts by military officials that undermined the government's position. See Peter Irons,
Introduction: Righting a Great Wrong, in JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 3, 4 (Peter Irons ed., 1989); Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the
Border: The Interdependence of Foreign Policy and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE
HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 53, 75 (1998); Yamamoto, supra note 36, at 2-3. Nevertheless, these
distortions are irrelevant to explanations of judicial deference for two reasons. First, as
discussed above, sufficient evidence existed for the Supreme Court to strike down the
government's policies in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Second, the only relevant inquiry in
accounting for deference is whether a judge engages in the process of passing judgment on
the facts before him. However normatively contemptible the distortions appear in
retrospect, they do not affect the descriptive analysis of deference in the Japanese-American
cases.
66. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943).
67. Id. at 83-84.
68. See id. at 84, 89.
69. See id. at 83.
70. Id. at 89.
71. Id. at 91-92.
72. Id. at 92.
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because of the threat posed by disloyal Japanese-Americans who were not
easily identifiable. 73 It rejected Hirabayashi's Fifth Amendment challenge to his
conviction.
74
Korematsu was a more divisive case for the Supreme Court. The case
concerned the constitutionality of Korematsu's conviction for failing to obey an
exclusion order.7' Applying the "most rigid scrutiny, ' '7 6 the Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion order and Korematsu's conviction.77 The Supreme Court
stated that it intended for Endo to decide the current validity of the internment
camps. 7" Korematsu only decided the validity of the exclusion policy at the time
government decisionmakers established it and Korematsu violated it.
79
In Endo, the Supreme Court reviewed the lawfulness of interning Japanese-
Americans found to be loyal and ordered their immediate, unconditional
release.s Curiously, the main reason offered was not constitutional law,8 ' but
the lack of authorization by President Roosevelt and Congress for the War
Relocation Authority to intern Japanese-Americans found to be loyal. 8'
Theoretically, the Supreme Court left the constitutional issues untouched, a
73- Id. at iol.
74. Id. at lO5.
75. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944).
76. Id. at 216. As discussed in Part II, two approaches would have offered more rigid scrutiny of
the government's actions: (1) a high degree of perception deference and a low degree of
means deference, and (2) a low degree of both perception and means deference.
77. Id. at 219. Scholars have questioned the Supreme Court's relatively relaxed interpretation in
Korematsu of what the "most rigid scrutiny" entails. See, e.g., Anthony F. Renzo, Making a
Burlesque of the Constitution: Military Trials of Civilians in the War Against Terrorism, 31 VT. L.
REV. 447, 547 (2007); Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict
Scrutiny, 49 How. L.J. 241, 311 (20o6). The Supreme Court has conceded that Korematsu
vividly shows that even when applying the "most rigid scrutiny," the Supreme Court has
"sometimes fail[ed] to detect an illegitimate racial classification." Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
78. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222 ("The Endo case ... graphically illustrates the difference
between the validity of an order to exclude and the validity of a detention order after
exclusion has been effected."); Gudridge, supra note ii, at 1939.
79. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219, 222.
8o. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,297, 304 (1944).
gi. See id. at 297 ("[W]e do not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been
argued.").
s2. Id. at 302 ("He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur. When the power to
detain is derived from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage,
detention which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized.").
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point two concurring Justices noted and criticized. 81 For this reason, Endo
is arguably a decision based on statutory interpretation. 8' However,
constitutional principles may have also influenced the decision. 8s
II. ROLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN
CASES
The role of judicial deference in the Japanese-American cases is
misunderstood. Assessments to date wrongly assume that judicial deference
16 8only exists as a matter of degree or as a condition present or not present.8 7
Going beyond these traditional approaches, this Note evaluates the forms of
deference present and not present in the Japanese-American cases by
examining what aspects of the government's decisionmaking process did and
did not receive deference. The inquiry yields a conclusion that calls into
question current scholarship. Judicial deference existed in a low degree
concerning the government's perception of a threat from disloyal Japanese-
Americans and in a high degree concerning the means chosen to address the
perceived threat. Therefore, deference was neither categorically present nor
unquestionably present in an overall high degree. Perhaps the best evidence is
the lack of any other satisfactory account of judicial deference that offers a
consistent theory capable of explaining and reconciling the outcomes in
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo.
83. See id. at 307-o8 (Murphy, J., concurring) (stating that the internment camps were
unconstitutional); id. at 3o8-1o (Roberts, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority opinion
for avoiding the constitutional issues arising from the internment policy).
84. See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The Judiciaty in Times of National Security Crisis and Terrorism:
Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 30 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
165, 178-79 (20o6); Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 17, at 313.
85. See, e.g., Gudridge, supra note ii, at 1956-58.
86. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the Promise of Brown, 48 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 899, 924 n. 194 (2004); Michael Kagan, Destructive Ambiguity: Enemy Nationals
and the Legal Enabling of Ethnic Conflict in the Middle East, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 263,
278 (2007); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Militaty
Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441,454 (2005).
87. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 14, at 503.
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A. Definition ofJudicial Deference
Judicial deference is a slippery concept to define precisely.88 However, its
requisite features are not particularly controversial. 8  Deference requires two
elements. The first is freedom to reach an independent conclusion disagreeing
with the decisionmaker in question.9" The second is an affirmative choice to
accept another decisionmaker's conclusion without reaching an independent
conclusion.91 These two features suggest a helpful definition of judicial
deference: an independent judgment not to reach an independent conclusion
interpreting a set of facts presented to a court that is expressed through the
adoption of another decisionmaker's conclusion.
A useful feature of this definition is that it suggests the inadequacy of
conclusions concerning judicial deference that describe deference only as a
matter of degree with respect to a decisionmaker's overall judgment or as a
condition present or not present. It does so because these positions assume
there is only one interpretation of one set of facts to be made by courts.9 2 That
is often inaccurate. For instance, in the Japanese-American cases, the Supreme
Court had to review at least two interpretations of two sets of facts: (1)
whether Japanese-Americans posed a security threat and (2) the best means of
88. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1983).
89. Compare Solove, supra note 17, at 946 (defining deference as "the practice of accepting,
without much questioning or skepticism, the factual and empirical judgments made by the
decisionmaker under review"), with Horwitz, supra note 23, at 1073 ("Deference, then,
involves a decisionmaker (D1) setting aside its own judgment and following the judgment
of another decisionmaker (D2) in circumstances in which the deferring decisionmaker, D1,
might have reached a different decision.").
go. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 1075-76; Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive
Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 656, 665 (2000).
91. See Solove, supra note 17, at 946; cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 138
(1977) (defining deference as judicial self-restraint that allocates to political institutions
responsibility for deciding which rights to recognize); RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 314 (1996) (defining a deferential judge as "cautious and
circumspect, and thus hesitant about intruding" on another decisionmaker's decision); Scott
M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 777, 780 (20o8) ("At its core,
deference is the ceding of one power in favor of another.").
92. Similarly, methods of judicial review such as strict scrutiny and rational basis review are best
understood as descriptions of the degree of deference without an assessment of form. For
instance, to say a court employed strict scrutiny does not answer what aspect of government
decisionmaking received strict scrutiny. Thus, merely stating the method of judicial review
assumes that there is only one interpretation of one set of facts to be made by a judge, and
that the judge employs the same level of judicial review to all aspects of the government's
decisionmaking process. In practice, both assumptions are frequently wrong.
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responding to the perceived threat. When this Note references different
"forms" of judicial deference, it references the different aspects of
decisionmaking requiring interpretation in a particular case.
B. Conventional Understanding of Deference in the Japanese-American Cases
The conventional understanding of the Japanese-American cases offers two
very similar accounts of judicial deference. The first position argues that the
Supreme Court exercised a very high degree of deference in the cases. 93 The
second position argues that the Supreme Court categorically deferred to
military decisionmakers.94 Despite this slight difference, the basic thrust of the
conventional understanding is the same: the Supreme Court did not
meaningfully police the government's policies toward Japanese-Americans and
effectively abdicated judicial review once the government invoked military
necessity as a justification for its actions. 9 Taking the next step, scholars then
93. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of
Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-Record Wars," 73 GEo. L.J. 931, 962 (1985) (calling Hirabayashi
"an example of extreme deference"); Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v.
United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 120 (1996)
("[O]ur disagreement [with Korematsu] results from defining the appropriateness of the
degree and place for judicial deference."); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political
Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 410 (20o6) ("Deference, however, can certainly be taken too
far. Indeed, it gave us the terrible decision in Korematsu." (citation omitted)); Patricia Wald
& Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: Reflections on Senator Schumer's
Essay, 1 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 41, 65 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court gave
"excessive deference").
94. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 86, at 454 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Korematsu gave
the military's factual assertions "almost limitless deference"); Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1037-39 (1984-1985) (arguing
that the Supreme Court in Korematsu effectively surrendered its power of judicial review to
the political branches and essentially treated as a political question the military's policy
toward Japanese-Americans); Luppe B. Luppen, Note, Just When I Thought I Was Out, They
Pull Me Back in: Executive Power and the Novel Reclassification Authority, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
RaV. 1115, 1133 (2007) ("With its controversial ruling in Korematsu, the Supreme Court
articulated a categorical principle of wartime judicial deference to the Executive Branch."
(citation omitted)); C. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART & FLOYD W. MATSON,
PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 333 (1954) (arguing that the Supreme Court in the
Japanese-American cases did not require evidence that the necessity of excluding Japanese-
Americans from the West Coast was in fact the military's judgment and that the military's
conclusion was reasonable); Grossman, supra note 34, at 661 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's approach in Hirabayashi and Korematsu represents "supine deference").
95. See, e.g., Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918-2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907, 936
(20o6); Yamamoto, supra note 36, at 1-2; cf Masur, supra note 86, at 445 ("The perceived
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conclude that the Japanese-American cases exemplify how national security
needs trump civil liberties during national emergencies. 96 While some scholars
have offered normative defenses of the cases, 97 a modern descriptive
explanation disagreeing with the conventional understanding does not exist.
The approach taken by advocates of the conventional understanding is
problematic. Advocates tend to merge normative criticisms and descriptive
analysis of the Japanese-American cases, potentially allowing normative
judgments inappropriately to inform what should be neutral descriptive
analysis. 98 The problem with these analyses is not that the normative judgment
is necessarily wrong. It is that combining the two inquiries undermines the
persuasiveness of descriptive accounts by suggesting that a normative
judgment colored the descriptive inquiry and made the descriptive conclusion
inevitable regardless of countervailing evidence.99
In short, the conventional understanding concerning judicial deference in
the Japanese-American cases is wrong. Not only do advocates fail to account
for Endo,' their evaluations show a misunderstanding of precisely what
deference is. The best evidence of their misunderstanding is their blunt
duty of courts and judges to defer to the factual assertions and judgments of executive
branch actors in times of war represents the unifying principle of all modem wartime
cases.").
96. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 283-84; cf. Mark C. Rahdert, Double-Checking Executive
Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and Hamdan, 8o TEMP. L. REV. 451, 476 (2007) ("As
the experience of Korematsu demonstrates, undue deference... may well present the gravest
danger to the preservation of equal justice under law.").
97. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 207-11 (defending Koremarsu).
98. Lichtman, supra note 95, at 936 ("The World War II Japanese internment cases are probably
the most glaring and notorious examples of the Court's willingness to kowtow before
military judgment.... The key to the Court's approval of the curfew and relocation orders
is their finding in both [Hirabayashi and Korematsu] that the military deemed these policies
necessary."); Timothy Sandefur, The Wolves and the Sheep of Constitutional Law: A Review
Essay on Kermit Roosevelt's The Myth of Judicial Activism, 23 J.L. & POL. 1, 36 (2007) ("An
ironic honor roll of 'great moments in judicial deference' would have to include such
shameful decisions as ... Korematsu -not a pleasant record, to say the least."); Yamamoto,
supra note 36, at 61 ("The potentially disastrous ramifications of continued ambiguity [in
guidelines for governmental conduct in national emergencies] are illustrated by the
Korematsu case itself in which the Court deferred to the government's unexamined assertion
of military necessity and thereby sanctioned the tragic and unjustified deprivation of
personal liberty.").
99. Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 1u8 YALE
L.J. 1762, 1824 (2009) (suggesting that emotion causes international law scholars "to
overvalue the importance of international law and the extent to which it binds nations").
1oo. Cf Gudridge, supra note ii, at 1934 & n.lo (arguing that constitutional law scholars tend to
forget Endo).
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assessments of the Supreme Court's approach in the Japanese-American cases
as representing a high degree of deference.
1 or categorical deference.1 2
Rejecting approaches limiting evaluations of deference to overall degree or
categorical presence, this Note adds a new dimension: an inquiry into the form
of judicial deference. By examining what aspects and to what extent a
government decisionmaker's judgment did or did not receive deference, this
Note presents a comprehensive theory of judicial deference that accounts for
the Supreme Court's approach in Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo.
C. A New Framework To Evaluate Judicial Deference
The framework proposed in this Note begins from the premise that
government decisionmakers must make different decisions in the course of the
decisionmaking process to respond to national emergencies and that courts
may defer to these judgments in different degrees. In devising policies toward
Japanese-Americans, government decisionmakers made the following two
decisions. First, they interpreted evidence to reach a decision concerning the
existence and scope of the threat, if any, posed by Japanese-Americans. Once
they identified a threat - regardless of whether they did so correctly - they had
to interpret additional evidence to make a second decision about the proper
means to respond to the threat. The curfew,0 3 exclusion, 0 4 and internment'
policies resulted from these two decisions.
The two forms of judicial deference identified in this Note correspond to
these two decisions. Perception deference is an independent decision not to
reach an independent conclusion concerning whether and to what extent a
threat exists where the decision is expressed through the adoption of
government decisionmakers' conclusion. Means deference is an independent
decision not to reach an independent conclusion concerning the proper means
to respond to the perceived threat where the decision is expressed through the
adoption of government decisionmakers' conclusion.
101. See sources cited supra note 93.
102. See sources cited supra note 94.
103. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the government's curfew policy
for Japanese-Americans in designated military areas on the West Coast).
104. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (upholding the government's decision
to exclude Japanese-Americans from the West Coast).
105. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (striking down the government's decision to intern
Japanese-Americans known to be loyal).
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Considering the degree of judicial deference only becomes useful after
precisely identifying the form of deference in question. The reason is that very
few correlations exist between the degree to which a court engages in
perception and means deference. To illustrate, imagine overall judicial
deference as a single-quadrant graph with "perception deference" as the x-axis
and "means deference" as the y-axis, with both axes ranging from zero to
infinitely high. When a court reviews a government decisionmaker's actions,
some point in the first quadrant represents the correct degree of perception and
means deference. In the Japanese-American cases, that point is low perception
deference and high means deference.
The combination of perception and means deference degrees has been
different in past national emergency cases. Different accommodations of
national security needs and civil liberties have resulted. In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,0 6 the Supreme Court exercised a relatively high degree of perception
deference and a low degree of means deference. It did so by concluding that a
presumption favoring the government's evidence that a person is an enemy
combatant would be constitutional"0 7 but by checking the means chosen by the
government by requiring that Hamdi receive notice and a fair opportunity to
be heard before a neutral decisionmaker to challenge the government's
position." 8 Conversely, a low degree of perception deference and a high degree
of means deference is possible. A good example is Ebel v. Drum'0 9 where a
district court struck down the exclusion of a German-American from a
designated military area on the East Coast by concluding that the military's
perception of a threat of espionage and sabotage on the East Coast was
unreasonable"0 despite strongly suggesting that it would have deferred to
106. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
107. Id. at 534 (stating that "[t]he Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor
of the Government's evidence" that a person is an enemy combatant).
1O8. Id. at 533; see also id. at 532 (rejecting the government's preferred procedure when a United
States citizen is held as an enemy combatant in the United States).
lO9. 52 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 1943).
11o. See id. at 197 ("I do not believe in the light of conditions prevailing in the Eastern Military
Area in April of this year, the time when the exclusion order was applied, there was present a
reasonable and substantial basis for the judgment the military authorities made, i.e., that the
threat of espionage and sabotage to our military resources was real and imminent.
Consequently, the order at the time it was applied was an excessive exercise of authority and
invalid.").
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military decisionmakers concerning its choice of means had it reached that
question."'
Other combinations are also possible. In the district court decision vacating
Korematsu's conviction, the district court exercised low perception deference
and low means deference. The court argued that military necessity should
never justify allowing government actions to escape close scrutiny."' In doing
so, it strongly suggested that the judicial decisions convicting Korematsu and
affirming the conviction erred by not employing little perception deference and
little means deference.
Similarly, a high degree of perception deference and a high degree of means
deference is possible. While rare in practice, the Supreme Court effectively
embraced this combination in Ex parte Vallandigham where it concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the proceedings of a military commission that
tried, sentenced, and imprisoned a citizen for expressing sympathy for the
South in the Civil War."3 Although it decided this case on institutional power
grounds," 4 the Supreme Court refused to second-guess the government's
perception of a threat and the means chosen to address the threat. Such an
approach represents high perception deference and high means deference
because the Supreme Court repudiated its power to review the military
commission's decision. It effectively entrusted civil liberties to the protection of
military decisionmakers.
There are three slight qualifications to the model offered. First, it is also
entirely possible that deference may occur in different forms beyond perception
deference and means deference. Identifying those additional forms is a worthy
next step for scholarship."' Second, the perception and means inquiries
iii. See id. at 194 (noting the reading of Hirabayashi that courts should not second-guess
government branches' choice of means responding to threats in war when the Constitution
delegates war-making authority to those branches).
112. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 14o6, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
113. See Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (i Wall.) 243, 251-54 (1863).
114. See id. at 252.
115. In recent years, a number of scholars have attempted to evaluate judicial decisionmaking in
times of war by presenting institutional models that contend that a critical fact in whether
the Supreme Court defers to the government is the extent to which the political branches
oversee and authorize the government's actions. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process
Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 22-25 (2004) (suggesting
that the Japanese-American cases represent an institutional process model where the
Supreme Court is more willing to uphold the government's actions when Congress
authorizes the executive's actions); cf Michael Cook, Note, "Get Out Now or Risk Being
Taken Out by Force": Judicial Review of State Government Emergency Power Following a Natural
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sometimes inform each other. A judge's perception that an emergency exists
with a great potential for toppling national sovereignty would almost certainly
influence whether the judge exercises discretion to defer to another
decisionmaker's judgment about the best means of responding to the threat.
Similarly, a judge's perception that no threat exists affects whether the judge
will uphold the government's policies. For example, in Endo the Supreme
Court's independent judgment that Endo did not pose a security threat
motivated the Supreme Court to strike down the internment without inquiring
into the appropriateness of the means chosen." 6 Nevertheless, these cases seem
rare. In most cases, the degrees of perception and means deference will
probably differ. That said, the potential for one inquiry to influence the other
inquiry highlights the importance of treating the perception and means
inquiries distinctly to ensure analytic precision. Third, the new model offered
does not purport to explain judicial deference in all contexts. For instance, it
probably does not apply except at a very general level to appellate courts'
deference to judge and jury determinations at a lower level. Nevertheless, the
model provides a useful means to evaluate judicial deference in national
emergency contexts where civil liberties and security needs stand in tension."7
Additionally, it could have broad implications for administrative law because it
provides a useful means to evaluate deference anytime a decisionmaker has
authority to perceive a problem and to choose the means to respond to the
perceived problem.
These qualifications aside, the model has three substantial advantages over
assessments of judicial deference only as a matter of degree"' or, bluntly, as a
condition either present or not present." 9 First, it offers greater precision in
assessing precisely which aspects of the government's decisionmaking process
received deference and which aspects did not. Having a precise account is
Disaster, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 265, 269 (2006) (arguing that courts used a two-pronged
test to review emergency powers consisting of a "Process Prong" where courts evaluate
whether politically accountable government branches have approved of the emergency
action and a "Reasonableness Prong" where courts evaluate an action's reasonableness). The
model offered in this Note does not conflict with these institutional process arguments. In
fact, these institutional process arguments may suggest a third form of deference that
considers the institutional considerations affecting judicial review.
116. See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
117. The civil liberties affected by the model include any rights affecting individual freedom that
potentially undermine the government's attempts to protect national security. Cf. POSNER,
supra note 2, at 149 (defining civil liberties broadly to include all aspects of the law with
implications for individual freedom).
118. See sources cited supra note 93.
119. See sources cited supra note 94.
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critical to assessing trends over time in national emergency jurisprudence and
whether, if ever, Cicero's maxim that "[w]hen arms speak, the laws are
silent"' 0 has been true. Second, it provides helpful guidance when judges
balance civil liberties and security needs during national emergencies. Many
scholars condemn the balance between civil liberties and national security that
the Supreme Court reached in the Japanese-American cases.'21 If they are
correct, high means deference and low perception deference is a normatively
suboptimal combination. If means deference is more consequential for
protecting civil liberties than perception deference,' 22 two combinations that
may strike a better balance are high perception deference and low means
deference, and low perception deference and low means deference. By
analytically separating the aspects of government decisionmaking, judges may
be able to identify the proper degree of deference for each form to reach a
proper accommodation of civil liberties and security needs before deciding
difficult cases. Third, by highlighting the consequences of judicial deference for
the balance between civil liberties and security needs, the model enables society
to have the difficult, but necessary, normative discussion about how to balance
the two compelling interests in advance of national emergencies.
D. Application of the New Framework to the Japanese-American Cases
The Supreme Court consistently exercised a low degree of perception
deference and a high degree of means deference in the Japanese-American
cases. While the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the government's
position in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, it only did so after reaching an
independent decision interpreting the facts available to it that Japanese-
Americans posed a security threat. The Supreme Court's independent inquiry
produced the opposite conclusion in Endo, motivating the Supreme Court to
strike down the internment policy.' 3 In short, Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and
120. CICERO, supra note 5, at 17.
121. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Ethniciry and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary
Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571, 586-87 (1995); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting
Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 8o5-o6 (20o6);
Yen, supra note 51, at 7.
122. Even if means deference is more important, the perception inquiry still matters. The
perception inquiry alone caused the Supreme Court to strike down the internment of
Japanese-Americans known to be loyal in Ex parte Endo by holding that a Japanese-
American known to be loyal posed no security threat. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297
(1944).
123. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 297.
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Endo are not simple stories of the Supreme Court blindly adopting all aspects
of government decisionmakers' conclusions. The Supreme Court's approach
was more nuanced and complex.
1. Perception Deference
The Supreme Court did not defer to government decisionmakers'
perception of a threat in the Japanese-American cases. Rather than adopting
the government's conclusion that a threat of espionage and sabotage existed,
the Supreme Court made an independent decision about whether Japanese-
Americans posed a security threat. Just because the Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion that government decisionmakers reached concerning the
scope and scale of the threat in Hirabayashi and Korematsu does not mean that
judicial deference occurred. Agreement or disagreement with another
decisionmaker's conclusion is irrelevant to whether judicial deference occurs."
Thus, the different results of the Supreme Court's inquiry do not suggest a
different degree of judicial deference to the government's perception of a
threat.
a. Hirabayashi
In Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court passed judgment on the government's
perception of an external threat from the Japanese military and an internal
threat from disloyal Japanese-Americans. It concluded that the perception of a
broad national emergency from extrinsic Japanese military forces was
reasonable."' 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court evaluated the
significance of facts on the record concerning the Japanese military's success
and the relatively weak state of the American military in the Pacific between the
attack on Pearl Harbor and early 1942 when government decisionmakers began
instituting curfews.126 Because the Supreme Court concluded that these factors
made the government's perception of a threat reasonable, it necessarily passed
judgment on available facts by assigning them weight and considering their
significance. While a reasonability inquiry is certainly not de novo review, it
necessarily involves second-guessing. Thus, the Supreme Court did not merely
adopt the government decisionmakers' conclusion without passing judgment
on the available facts. By definition, it did not defer.
124. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 1075.
125. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94 (1943).
126. See id. at 93-94.
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The Supreme Court also reviewed the factual context surrounding
government decisionmakers' perception of an internal security threat from
supposedly disloyal Japanese-Americans. After concluding that Congress and
the executive provided the military with sufficient authority to promulgate
curfews for Japanese-Americans,1 27 the Supreme Court stated that the
Constitution gave Congress and the executive broad discretion in perceiving a
threat and choosing the proper means of responding to the threat:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the
exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of
warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the
threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting
it128
it. 2
Immediately after this sentence, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that
in situations such as the circumstances under which the political branches
authorized the curfew policy, courts should effectively suspend judicial review
and not second-guess the duly authorized policymaker:
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment
and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the
Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of
warmaking, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their
action or substitute its judgment for theirs. 29
If the Supreme Court's opinion stopped here, it would be true that the
Supreme Court exercised a high level of perception deference. The Supreme
Court would have then refused to second-guess the government's judgment
about whether Japanese-Americans posed an internal security threat. But that
did not happen. The first sentence of the Supreme Court's next paragraph
strongly suggested the Supreme Court then proceeded to take the step it just
purported to reject by engaging in judicial review: "The actions taken must be
appraised in the light of the conditions with which the President and Congress
were confronted in the early months of 1942 . ,130 Thus, immediately after
127. Id. at 92.
128. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
i29. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. (emphasis added). While the passive voice construction unfortunately left ambiguous
the identity of the actor responsible for reviewing the military's decisions, it seems far-
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stating a principle suggesting absolute perception deference given emergency
conditions, the Supreme Court conspicuously violated the principle. 13' At the
very minimum, this move suggests that deference in Hirabayashi is a more
complex and nuanced story than appears at first blush.
The most important factor undermining deferential language in
Hirabayashi is the Supreme Court's independent judgment concerning whether
the military's perception of an internal threat was reasonable. 32 In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court relied on factors including the concentration of
Japanese-Americans on the West Coast; 133 the concentration of vital industries
for the war effort where the military imposed curfews;1 34 Japanese-Americans'
insularity and lack of assimilation;1 31 the large portion of Japanese-Americans
sent to Japanese language schools, some of which supposedly cultivated loyalty
to Japan;3 6 Japan's practice of recognizing the children of Japanese immigrants
to the United States as Japanese citizens in many instances; 37 the close
relationship between influential community members and Japanese
consulates; 13' and the practical and legal restrictions limiting Japanese-
Americans' opportunities in the United States.1 39 Weighing the significance of
these factors, the Supreme Court concluded that the government's perception
of an internal threat was reasonable because some grounds existed to justify
singling out Japanese-Americans for unique treatment on the West Coast. 140
Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts and rational
inferences from the facts supported the military's judgment concerning the
danger and imminence of a threat from espionage and sabotage.1 41 Although a
fetched to suggest that the Supreme Court was referring to something other than judicial
review.
131. In Korematsu, the Supreme Court also belied the principle stated in Hirabayashi by referring
to the serious consideration given in Hirabayashi to whether there was an unconstitutional
delegation of powers, whether the curfew policy exceeded the government's war powers,
and whether the curfew policy represented unconstitutional racial discrimination.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944).
132. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 95.
133. Id. at 96.
134. See id. at 95.
13s. Id. at 96.
136. Id. at 97.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 98.
139. Id.
140. Id. at lol.
141. Id. at 103-04.
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troubling conclusion today, the Supreme Court also found that Japanese
ancestry was probative evidence of potential disloyalty because Japan
threatened America's shores and Japanese-Americans shared a common
ancestry with the enemy's soldiers.' 42 Having reviewed the scope and scale of
the threat of Japanese-Americans engaging in espionage and sabotage, the
Supreme Court upheld Hirabayashi's conviction for violating the military's
curfew policy.'43
Advocates of the conventional understanding of the Japanese-American
cases suggest that the Supreme Court accepted without critical review the
government's perception of an internal threat from disloyal Japanese-
Americans.' 44 The reasons offered for this conclusion include the supposed
absence of evidence supporting the military's assertions and judicial notice
given to the military's generalized conclusions about the threat posed by
Japanese-Americans. 4 However, neither of these reasons is compelling. The
better explanation of Hirabayashi is that the Supreme Court reached an
independent judgment agreeing with the government's perception of a threat.
The two reasons ignore the fact that the Supreme Court did engage in a
reasonableness inquiry and found adequate support for the military's
perception of a threat.146 Without passing judgment on the facts underlying
the military's perception of a threat, the Supreme Court could not have
concluded that the perception was reasonable. 47 While a reasonableness
inquiry is not the same as de novo review, it does require an independent
decision interpreting the significance of available facts. By definition, the
resulting conclusion is not the product of deference because it necessarily
requires second-guessing the government's conclusion. In contrast, if the
Supreme Court had exercised a high degree of perception deference, it would
have suspended any independent decision about the nature of the threat posed
by Japanese-Americans. The Supreme Court did not take that step.
b. Korematsu
The Supreme Court also exercised a low degree of perception deference in
Korematsu. As in Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court independently evaluated the
142. See id. at ioi.
143. See id. at lO5.
144. See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 95, at 936; Yamamoto, supra note 36, at i.
145. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 36, at 1-2.
146. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 104.
147. See id. at 101-02.
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facts before it and second-guessed government decisionmakers' perception of a
threat. The best evidence is that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
argument that racial prejudice motivated the government's perception of a
threat.'48 Because the Supreme Court reached its conclusion by considering the
"real military dangers" 140 surrounding the government's perception of a threat,
the Supreme Court reached an independent conclusion interpreting the set of
facts before it. Having reached an independent conclusion, the Supreme Court
by definition did not defer.
In reaching the conclusion that "real military dangers"' 0 existed justifying
the government decisionmakers' perception of a threat, the Supreme Court
interpreted the significance of several facts appearing on the record and
concluded that some Japanese-Americans were disloyal. These facts included
the refusal of about five thousand Japanese-Americans to swear unqualified
loyalty to the United States over Japan and the repatriation requests of several
thousand Japanese-Americans.''
Additional facts that led the Supreme Court to conclude that the perception
of a threat was justifiable were that the United States was at war with Japan,"5 2
quick action was imperative,"5 3 and "[t]here was evidence of disloyalty on the
part of some.' 5 4 Based on these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the
military's perception of a threat at the time it devised the exclusion policy was
justifiable.' Because the Supreme Court evaluated facts on the record to find
justification for the perception of a threat from disloyal Japanese-Americans,
the Supreme Court did not merely adopt government decisionmakers'
conclusions concerning their perception of a threat. Thus, the Supreme Court
did not defer.
As with Hirabayashi, scholars have cited much of the same language in
Korematsu for their contention that the Supreme Court blindly deferred to the
military's perception of a threat.' s6 However, these arguments cannot account
148. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
149. Id.
15O. Id.
151. Id. at 219.
152. Id. at 223.
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id. at 223.
155. See id. at 224.
156. See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 95, at 936; Yamamoto, supra note 36, at 9; see also Walter F.
Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Japanese American Cases: A Study in the Uses of Stare Decisis, 11
W. POL. 0-3, 4-5 (1958) ("The Court, without any substantial evidence other than the word
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for the elements of Korematsu reflecting an independent judgment concerning
the military's perception of a threat. Had the Supreme Court exercised a high
degree of perception deference, it would not even have purported to police the
government's decision under the "most rigid scrutiny"1 7 to evaluate whether
racial prejudice motivated the military's exclusion policy. Moreover, the
Supreme Court would not have bothered evaluating the factual record
presented to the Court, as distorted as it was,"s8 to determine whether the
military's perception of an internal security threat by Japanese-Americans at
the time it devised the exclusion order had any basis in fact.5 9 As in
Hirabayashi, the fact that the Supreme Court went through the process of
reaching an independent judgment in reviewing the record available to it negates
the position that complete perception deference occurred.
c. Endo
Lastly, the Supreme Court exercised a low degree of perception deference
in Endo. Rather than simply deferring to the government's perceived need to
continue detaining Japanese-Americans in internment camps, the Supreme
Court reached an independent judgment that the government lacked the
authority to intern Japanese-Americans found to be loyal. 6° Despite conceding
that Endo was "a loyal and law-abiding citizen '' 6 ' and "that it is beyond the
power of the War Relocation Authority to detain citizens against whom no
charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made for a period longer than
that necessary to separate the loyal from the disloyal and to provide the
necessary guidance for relocation, ' ' 162 the government nevertheless claimed
authority to detain Japanese-Americans who refused to follow the
of the commanding general, accepted every contention of the government."); Yamamoto,
supra note 36, at 21 ("In both the Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions, the Court adopted
without factual scrutiny the military's unsubstantiated assertion of necessity."); id. at 27
(noting that the Court gave an "extreme degree of deference to military judgment in
Korematsu").
157. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
158. In the early 198os, the military's deliberate suppression of evidence undermining its
arguments in Korematsu came to light and motivated a movement to reverse the convictions
of Japanese-Americans charged with violating the military's policies. See Irons, supra note
65, at 4-5-
i5g. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
16o. See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,302 (1944).
161. Id. at 294.
162. Id. at 295.
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government's prescribed leave procedures.'6 3 The government argued that it
had authority pursuant to Executive Order No. 9102 "to make regulations
necessary and proper for controlling situations created by the exercise of the
powers expressly conferred for protection against espionage and sabotage.164
The government also cited the extraordinary powers it possessed because of the
state of war:
We believe there is a reasonable basis for the view that under the rare
conditions which gave rise to the program the Constitution does not
require abandonment of the requirement of leave application and that,
in the light of the extraordinary powers invoked by reason of the war,
detention pending such application is not so unreasonable or so
unrelated to the causes which gave rise to it as to transcend the war
power and fall under the condemnation of the Fifth Amendment. 
6
,
Based on these factors, the government argued that the detention was essential
to the evacuation program
66 and should be upheld.167
Critically reviewing the available evidence, the Supreme Court rejected the
government's argument. Rather than merely accepting government
decisionmakers' perception of their authority to detain Endo, the Supreme
Court was skeptical. It applied the canon of constitutional avoidance by
presuming that Congress and the executive branch did not intend to authorize
potentially unconstitutional acts, presumably meaning the detention of
Japanese-Americans conceded to be loyal.1
68
After invoking this preference for constitutionally unproblematic
interpretations, the Supreme Court narrowly read the authorization given to
policymakers by Congress and the executive as limited to protecting the war
effort against espionage and sabotage' 69 after considering the text of the
163. See id. at 297.
164. Id.
165. Brief for the United States at 82, Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (No. 70).
166. Endo, 323 U.S. at 295.
167. E.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 165, at 45.
168. Endo, 323 U.S. at 299-300 ("We have likewise favored that interpretation of legislation
which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality.... In interpreting
a wartime measure we must assume that their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible
accommodation between those liberties and the exigencies of war. We must assume, when
asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive authority, that the
lawmakers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and
unmistakably indicated by the language they used.").
169. See id. at 300.
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authorizations and the legislative history. 170 Having independently reviewed
the sources supposedly justifying the detention of citizens conceded to be
loyal,' 7' the Supreme Court concluded that government decisionmakers lacked
authority to detain citizens conceded to be loyal because the government's
detention power derived from its power to protect against espionage and
sabotage, and those people conceded to be loyal posed no such threat to the
war effort. '
72
Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that "[n]or may the power to
detain an admittedly loyal citizen or to grant him a conditional release be
implied as a useful or convenient step in the evacuation program, whatever
authority might be implied in case of those whose loyalty was not conceded or
established.' 73 After reaching these conclusions through an independent
reading of the text and legislative history, the Supreme Court ordered Endo's
unconditional release.' 74
Although slightly different from Hirabayashi and Korematsu because of its
focus on institutional authorization, Endo nonetheless represents low
perception deference. Not only did the Supreme Court independently evaluate
the facts before it to conclude that no threat existed from concededly loyal
Americans, 7 ' but the Supreme Court also decided that such detention had no
relationship whatsoever to furthering the government's exclusion policy
76
Because the Supreme Court reached these judgments through an evaluation of
the circumstances surrounding Endo's detention and the series of
authorizations purportedly justifying her detention, the Supreme Court
second-guessed the military.
2. Means Deference
In contrast to perception deference, a high degree of means deference
occurred in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Having found that sufficient basis
existed for the military to conclude a threat existed in Hirabayashi and
Korematsu, the Supreme Court accepted without critical inquiry government
decisionmakers' judgments about the means of addressing the threat of
17o. Id. at 300-01.
ii. See Brief for the United States, supra note 165, at 42.
172. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 302.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 304.




espionage and sabotage supposedly posed by disloyal Japanese-Americans.
Despite claiming to apply "the most rigid scrutiny" to the curfew and expulsion
policies,177 the Supreme Court did not decide for itself whether there were
alternatives to address the threat.' 78 Because the Supreme Court independently
concluded that no threat existed in Endo,'79 it did not reach the means inquiry.
a. Hirabayashi
Beginning from the premise that the government's war power necessarily
included "the power to wage war successfully, ''1 8O the Supreme Court expressly
refused to pass judgment on the military's choice of means in Hirabayashi. It
stated:
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment
and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the
Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of
war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of
their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.' 8'
Additionally, the Supreme Court found a constitutional basis for extending
a high level of means deference to the military, holding that the Constitution
gave the military broad discretion to determine the means chosen to address
perceived threats in warfare. 82 Framing the decisionmakers' choice as between
effecting substantial harm on Japanese-Americans by imposing a curfew or
ignoring a meaningful threat, 8 ' the Supreme Court concluded that the
Constitution did not require decisionmakers to ignore the threat of espionage
and sabotage by Japanese-Americans.184 Despite insisting that the curfew
policy was only justifiable if reasonably connected to addressing the threat of
espionage and sabotage, 8' the Supreme Court never truly made this inquiry. It
only cursorily considered the appropriateness of the fit between the end and
177. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
178. See id.; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943).
179. See supra Subsection II.D.l.c.
18o. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 (citation omitted).
181. Id. (emphasis added).
18z. Id.
183. See id. at 95.
184. See id.
185. See id. at iol.
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the means. It found the curfew policy "an appropriate measure against
sabotage" and "an obvious protection against the perpetration of sabotage most
readily committed during the hours of darkness. '1"6 In the end, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that it did not critically review the means chosen. It
openly conceded that whether it would have chosen the same means of
addressing the threat was irrelevant. 87 A comparison of the Supreme Court's
veritable laundry list of reasons justifying the government's perception of a
threat with the very limited discussion exploring the reasons for the
government's choice of means shows the difference in degree of deference
employed in the same case.
b. Korematsu
A high degree of means deference also occurred in Korematsu. Concluding
at the beginning that the exclusion policy's purpose was to address the threat
of espionage and sabotage, 8 8 the Supreme Court summarily found that
"exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a definite and close
relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage."'' 89 Rather than
passing judgment on available facts, the Supreme Court effectively adopted the
government's conclusion concerning the proper means by finding that the
military possessed institutional authority to make the judgment.1 90
Once the Supreme Court found sufficient institutional authority to choose
the proper means, the inquiry stopped. It never considered whether a less
restrictive means was available to address the perceived threat. Instead, the
Supreme Court found it sufficient that the government's judgments
underlying the internment policy were not facially unfounded. This approach
created a nearly irrefutable presumption favoring the government's choice of
means.
91
186. See id. at 99.
187. See id. at 102.
188. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944).
i8g. See id. at 218.
19o. Id. ("The military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our
shores, concluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion. They
did so, as pointed out in our Hirabayashi opinion, in accordance with Congressional






In Endo, the Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to reach an
independent decision concerning the means or defer to the government's
choice of means. Once it independently concluded that no threat existed from a
concededly loyal Japanese-American, the internment policy was necessarily
unjustifiable and unauthorized.' 92 Because it seems logically impossible to
uphold the means chosen to respond to a threat held to be nonexistent, where
the means affect important civil liberties, Endo represents neither deference nor
lack of deference. The Supreme Court effectively lacked one of the
requirements for judicial deference: freedom to uphold the government's
choice of means-the internment policy-after concluding that no threat
existed.' 93 The connection between the outcome of the perception deference
inquiry and the means deference inquiry in this context shows the importance
of treating the two concepts as analytically distinct. As Part III illustrates, the
consequences of collapsing the two inquiries can be disastrous.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE JAPANESE-
AMERICAN CASES
This Note's conclusion that the Supreme Court exercised little perception
deference in all three Japanese-American cases and complete means deference
to the extent possible has implications for four debates that have received
heightened attention in recent years. These debates concern (1) the correctness
of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Japanese-American cases, (2) general
criticisms of judicial deference, (3) how the Supreme Court balances civil
liberties and security, and (4) whether and how to accommodate extraordinary
situations under the Constitution.
All four controversies assign significance to the process of reasoning by
which the Supreme Court reached the outcomes in the Japanese-American
cases. By rejecting the conventional understanding of this process, this Note's
conclusion shows that the parameters of these discussions ought to change. In
doing so, this Note undermines the argument that "deference implies
difference" because "deference only has meaning if the court addressing the
matter independently would reach a conclusion different from that of the
Executive or the Legislature."'194 As the importance of assessments of judicial
192. See supra Subsection II.D.l.c.
193. See supra Section II.A.
194. Schapiro, supra note 90, at 665.
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deference within these debates illustrates, deference has meaning even if a
court's conclusion is the same as another decisionmaker's conclusion.
Deference without difference matters.
A. Implications for Criticisms of the Japanese-American Cases
The degrees and forms of judicial deference employed in the Japanese-
American cases have implications for criticisms of these cases. Scholarly
critiques tend to fall in two categories: criticisms of the Supreme Court for not
taking Japanese-Americans' rights seriously' and of the conclusions reached
concerning the threat of Japanese-Americans committing espionage and
sabotage.', 6 Within these two debates, this Note's conclusion cuts in two
surprising directions. It simultaneously undermines the argument that the
Supreme Court failed to take Japanese-Americans' rights seriously and may
support negative critiques of the holdings that Japanese-Americans posed a
security threat in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
1. Not Taking Rights Seriously
Some scholars assert that the Supreme Court ignored Japanese-Americans'
civil liberties in the Japanese-American cases.'97 This position begins from the
premises that judicial deference is improper in national emergency contexts 98
and that the more a court defers to another decisionmaker's judgment, the less
it protects civil liberties.'99 Based on these premises and the supposedly very
high or categorical deference exercised in the Japanese-American cases,2°°
scholars criticize the Supreme Court for completely failing to protect Japanese-
Americans' civil liberties."' However, as Part II demonstrates, the Supreme
195. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 209; Burt Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of
War, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 555, 567-68 (2005); Rostow, supra note 14, at 489-
91; Solove, supra note 17, at 998-1ooo.
196. These criticisms tend to focus on the alleged racism inherent in the premise that race had a
rational relationship to disloyalty among Japanese-Americans. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note
14, at 505-06; Yen, supra note 51, at 7.
197. See Luppen, supra note 94, at 1133-34; Neuborne, supra note 195, at 567-68; Solove, supra
note 17, at 998-1ooo; Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 47, 93.
198. See Gross, supra note 17, at 1034; Stone, supra note 17, at 22o8.
199. See Stone, supra note 17, at 2209 (suggesting that the more a court defers to the
government's judgment in national emergencies, the less it protects civil liberties).
2oo. See sources cited supra notes 93-94.
aol. See sources cited supra note 197.
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Court exercised only partial deference and, in fact, reached an independent
judgment concerning the threat of espionage and sabotage.2"2 Therefore, the
Supreme Court protected civil liberties more than commonly supposed. That is
not to say that the protection was necessarily normatively appropriate.
However, it does imply that criticisms require greater nuance to be completely
persuasive.
2. Conclusions Reached
In contrast, this Note provides new evidence that may support criticisms of
the Supreme Court for upholding policies based on the internal security threat
supposedly posed by Japanese-Americans in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. °3
Because the Supreme Court exercised a low degree of perception deference, it
independently concluded that race was probative evidence of loyalty, 0 4
contrary to critics' assumption that the Supreme Court completely deferred to
the government."' The Supreme Court's role in reaching this conclusion was
greater than commonly assumed, which may make its practice more
normatively contemptible under the logic that it is worse to reach an invidious
conclusion independently than to reach it through deference.
B. Implications for General Criticisms ofJudicial Deference
The Supreme Court's practice of judicial deference in the Japanese-
American cases cuts both ways concerning general critiques of judicial
deference. While it undermines theoretical criticisms that argue against the
practice of judicial deference in any context, it may or may not support
practical criticisms arguing that judicial deference is singularly inappropriate in
national emergency contexts.
1. Theoretical
Theoretical criticisms of judicial deference argue that judges should not
defer to other decisionmakers' judgments because doing so results in an
202. See supra Section II.D.
203. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 14, at 505-o6; Yen, supra note 51, at 7.
204. See supra Section II.D.
205. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 14, at 505-o6.
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abdication of judicial responsibility to protect civil liberties.2°6 They argue that
history shows that judicial deference "tends to override whatever level of
scrutiny [courts] appl[y] and [be] dispositive" of case outcomes, °7 even in
cases affecting fundamental civil liberties .2s Because of judges' expertise in
critical inquiry"°9 and ability to focus on individualized questions of justice,10
judges should arguably never defer to the judgment of government
decisionmakers 1'
The Supreme Court's practice of judicial deference in the Japanese-
American cases highlights an important flaw in theoretical criticisms. These
criticisms presume that the presence of judicial deference necessarily insulates
government decisions affecting civil liberties from critical review. 12 Under this
logic, when deference is present, courts automatically legitimize consequential
decisions for civil liberties without judicial inquiry by adding "a judicial stamp
of approval for the decisions made by government officials in the bureaucratic
state. " '
Strictly speaking, this description is inaccurate. Its monolithic conception
of deference presumes that the degree of judicial deference cannot differ for the
different aspects of government decisionmaking subject to judicial review. That
assumption is wrong. The high degree of deference given to the government's
choice of means in Hirabayashi and Korematsu did not impede the Supreme
Court from giving a low degree of deference to the government's perception of
a threat.2 14 Therefore, a high degree of judicial deference and critical review
may be simultaneously present in the same case.
ao6. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 17, at 1020; cf. Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts":
From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 691
(1992) (arguing that judges should not defer to judgments by mental health professionals in
state institutions).
ao. Solove, supra note 17, at 955; cf Wells, supra note 17, at 908 (arguing against judicial
deference because of the usefulness of critical review in promoting knowledge of
accountability and thereby producing better decisions).
208. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 17, at 96o-61.
aog. See id. at 1011-12.
21o. See id. at lo18.
211. Cf Yamamoto, supra note 36, at 41-42 ("Except as to actions under civilly-declared martial
law, the standard of judicial review of government restrictions of civil liberties of Americans
is not altered or attenuated by the government's contention that 'military necessity' or
'national security' justifies the challenged restrictions.").
2a2. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1020.
213. Id.




Practical criticisms of judicial deference in national emergency contexts
argue that judicial deference is particularly inappropriate in these
circumstances.21 An important practical criticism is that the government tends
to exaggerate the extent and scope of security threats during national
emergencies in order to amass power.2"6 This criticism focuses on the
government's tendency to push the balance between civil liberties and security
unnecessarily toward security during national emergencies. To counter this
problem, practical criticisms favor vigorous judicial review to ensure some
measure of governmental accountability, to check government decisionmakers
from overreaching, and to avoid needless repetition of past mistakes."'
The high degree of means deference present in Hirabayashi and Korematsu
supports criticisms of the Supreme Court's practice of deference in past
national emergencies. The Supreme Court deferred to the military about the
best means to respond to the perceived threat, tolerating restrictive means -
curfew and exclusion -without deciding for itself whether a less restrictive
policy could adequately address the threat218 It accordingly did not decide for
itself whether the policies promoted the greatest degree of protection for civil
liberties possible given the perceived threat. Therefore, the Supreme Court
does seem to have refused to exercise a check that may have prevented the
government from unnecessarily sacrificing Japanese-Americans' civil liberties.
Nevertheless, the low degree of perception deference exercised in
Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo2 9 undermines practical criticisms by
showing that judicial review may not be a panacea for unnecessary sacrifices of
civil liberties. Even though the Supreme Court reached an independent
judgment concerning the government's perception of a threat in Hirabayashi
and Korematsu, it still reached conclusions that many consider to represent an
215. See Gross, supra note 17, at 1034; Stone, supra note 17, at 2208-09; cf Jared A. Goldstein,
Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 1165, 1218 n.24o (2007) ("[D]eference to the
military's judgment that the Guantanamo detainees are enemy combatants would be
inappropriate."); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1230, 1282 (2007) ("[S]ubstantial deference to the executive is singularly
inappropriate in . . . foreign relations law that operates in the executive-constraining
zone.").
16. See Stone, supra note 17, at 2208.
217. See Wells, supra note 17, at 949.
218. See supra Subsection II.D.2.
9ig. See supra Subsection II.D.1.
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unnecessary deprivation of civil liberties °.2 2  Thus, judicial review may not
always prevent unnecessary deprivations of civil liberties during national
emergencies.
C. Implications for the Balance Between Civil Liberties and Security
An important implication of the Supreme Court's exercise of low
perception deference and high means deference in the Japanese-American cases
is that the balance between civil liberties and security during national
emergencies shifts less than traditionally anticipated. Scholars have long
assumed that the Japanese-American cases represent a preference for security
over civil libertiesY.1 But if that argument is correct, it seems inexplicable for
the Supreme Court to have exercised low perception deference after the
government invoked security needs.
National emergencies strain the balance between civil liberties and
security.222 Because efforts to promote security often come at the expense of
civil liberties, a tradeoff exists between the two values where one's gain is the
other's loss.2 2 3 This tension leads to a heightened risk of government
22o. See Yamamoto, supra note 36, at 29-30.
221. See, e.g., Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme
Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 175, 238 (1945); Stone, supra note
17, at 2206; Micah Herzig, Note, Is Korematsu Good Law in the Face of Terrorism? Procedural
Due Process in the Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 685, 686-87 (2002);
Lin, supra note 34, at 1917-18.
Z2. See REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 224; Gross, supra note 17, at 1028; Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 17, at 298; Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 767, 767 (2002).
223. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 31-32; Cole, supra note 12, at 2567. Some scholars reject the
argument that a zero-sum tradeoff exists between civil liberties and national security,
describing this tradeoff as a false choice. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Keeping the Constitution
Inside the Schoolhouse Gate-Students' Rights Thirty Years After Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 445, 471 (2000); Thomas P.
Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REv. 569, 612-13 (2008) (book review). Thomas
P. Crocker suggests that the tradeoff model is not helpful because it ignores a core value of
liberal democracy against performing actions degrading of fundamental human rights such
as torture. See Crocker, supra, at 612. Similarly, Daniel J. Solove criticizes the civil liberties-
security paradigm for inherently skewing the results of the balance in favor of security. See
Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 345
(2008). Nevertheless, the tradeoff paradigm remains highly influential and the primary lens
through which scholars have historically evaluated the Japanese-American cases. See, e.g.,
Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in
a Time of Crisis, lo ASIAN L.J. 37, 38 (2003); Stone, supra note 17, at 2206; Yamamoto, supra
note 36, at 4-7. For these reasons, Section III.C. considers the implications of judicial
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overreaching during national emergencies where society is made worse off by
the unnecessary undermining of fundamental civil liberties.2 4 The heightened
risk, combined with judges' great sensitivity to the potential of causing a
catastrophe by not taking security considerations seriously,22 is a troubling
confluence.
The conventional wisdom is that the presence of national emergencies
meaningfully affects how judges review government actions responding to
threats.2" 6 According to this view, the historical record shows that courts have
effectively established a presumption that restrictions on civil liberties
associated with government responses to national emergencies are
constitutional.2 7 To critics, the presumption of constitutionality illustrates a
troubling, but predictable, historical pattern of courts allowing government
decisionmakers to go too far in curtailing civil liberties during national
emergencies and regretting these decisions as the emergencies abate.2'
The role of judicial deference in the Japanese-American cases supports the
conventional wisdom so long as two assumptions are correct: (i) means
deference usually exists in a lower degree in nonemergency contexts and (2) a
connection exists between judicial deference and the balance between civil
liberties and security. The first assumption seems correct because the Supreme
Court's modern forms of scrutiny for Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause claims review actions to ensure at least some relationship exists between
the means chosen and legitimate government interests. 9 The second
assumption seems correct because the less the Supreme Court critically
inquires into government decisionmaking, the more protection of civil liberties
rests with government decisionmakers with a record of undervaluing civil
liberties relative to security during national emergencies. 3 ' If these two
assumptions are correct, the presence of war seriously affected the extent to
deference for the debate within the civil liberties and security tradeoff model. It is not a
normative endorsement of the model.
224. See Neuborne, supra note 195, at 555.
225. See Gross, supra note 17, at 1034.
226. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 224-25; Tushnet, supra note 34, at 281.
227. Stone, supra note 17, at 2208. However, Geoffrey R. Stone acknowledges that this trend may
be changing in light of the Supreme Court's recent record in adjudicating government
actions responding to the threat of terrorism. See id. at 2211-12.
228. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, supra note 1, at 1042.
229. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (Due Process Clause); Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (Equal Protection Clause).
230. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 12, at 2591-92; Purshaw, supra note 29, at 1035-36.
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which the Supreme Court critically reviewed the government's policies toward
Japanese-Americans in the Second World War.
Nevertheless, the shift was incomplete. Because the Supreme Court
exercised a low degree of perception deference,23' it followed an approach that
protected civil liberties more than conventionally assumed. In contrast, if the
Supreme Court did completely favor security over civil liberties, it would have
exercised a high degree of both perception deference and means deference.
However, that did not happen. Not only did the Supreme Court reach an
independent judgment that second-guessed the government's perception of a
threat in all three cases,232 the independent judgment proved decisive to the
outcome in Endo. 33 Therefore, the Supreme Court did not completely favor
security needs over civil liberties in the Second World War.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Hamdi struck down the government's
actions after exercising a high degree of deference to the government's
perception of a threat and a low degree of deference to the government's choice
of means in a national emergency context. 34 This also belies the assertion that
the balance between civil liberties and security always favors security during
national emergencies.
D. Implications for the Emergency Accommodation Debate
Among the most spirited of the four debates is the debate over whether and
how the existing constitutional structure should accommodate government
actions responding to national emergencies."' An important implication of the
role of deference in the Japanese-American cases is that, if the Supreme Court
pursues a similar course only in emergency contexts, the United States
arguably already has an "emergency constitution ''23 6 that accommodates
emergency contexts within the existing constitutional framework. This
231. See supra Subsection II.D.i.
232. See id.
233. See supra Subsection II.Di.c.
234. See supra Section II.C.
235. Compare Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, supra note 1, at 1045 ("We must build a new
constitution for the state of emergency .... "), with Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0.
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 18ol, 1868 (2004) ("[W]e might as
well embrace that anti-emergency Constitution and the rich framework within which we
have operated for so long.").
236. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, supra note 1, at 1030 (arguing that a unique




constitution may mitigate government decisionmakers' need for an explicit
emergency constitution or extralegal authority to act during national
emergencies.237 While this emergency constitution may be insufficient to
protect core civil liberties as evidenced by the Supreme Court's high degree of
means deference in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, it does provide some check on
government overreaching through the Supreme Court's critical inquiry into the
government's perception of a threat. It may be the emergency constitution we
never knew we had. If the Supreme Court's inquiry in Hamdi represents a
trend toward a high degree of perception deference and a low degree of means
deference, it may be an emergency constitution that has improved over time.
1. Desirability of an Emergency Constitution
Bruce Ackerman, the leading proponent of the emergency constitution
approach, argues that a separate regime should exist to accommodate
responses to national crises within a constitutional framework.238 One of the
main reasons Ackerman offers to support his thesis is that a temporary
emergency regime anticipated by Ackerman's emergency constitution would
enable the government to reassure citizens' confidence that the government's
response to national emergencies will be effective without permitting long-
term harm to civil liberties. 39 While having a reduced scope compared to
nonemergency contexts, the constitution would still cabin government
decisions that could harm long-term commitments to freedom and the rule of
law. 4° An important justification behind Ackerman's support for an
emergency constitution regime is the Supreme Court's record of not seriously
protecting core civil liberties from government infringement in past national
emergencies, as evidenced by Korematsu. 4
If followed only in national emergency contexts, the Supreme Court's
approach in the Japanese-American cases seems to meet the central features of
an emergency constitution: it allowed the government flexibility to perform
acts that may otherwise have been unlawful while preserving some check on
government decisionmaking through critical review into whether a threat truly
existed. Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court's high degree of means
deference motivated it to uphold the government's curfew and exclusion
237. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 305.
238. See Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, supra note 1, at 1030.
239. See id. at 1037.
240. See id. at lo44.
241. See id. at 1042.
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policies,' 42 the emergency constitution arguably failed to cabin government
decisions with long-term implications for freedom and the rule of law, a
necessary function of Ackerman's emergency constitution."43 That said, the
Supreme Court's low degree of perception deference through its critical inquiry
into government decisionmakers' perception of a threat suggests that the
Supreme Court protects core civil liberties more than Ackerman anticipates, as
evidenced by Endo.
However, the potential inadequacy of the Supreme Court's approach in the
Japanese-American cases also supports Ackerman's position to some extent.
Even if the Supreme Court's critical inquiry into the government's perception
of a threat enabled the Supreme Court to check government overreaching in
Endo, the Supreme Court's high degree of means deference in Hirabayashi and
Korematsu, if followed in other emergency contexts, may support Ackerman's
argument that an entirely different constitutional framework should apply in
emergency circumstances to the extent it demonstrates the inadequacy of the
current emergency constitution. More forgiving degrees and forms of
deference in emergency contexts may not be able to achieve the goals Ackerman
has in mind for an emergency constitution. Nevertheless, if Hamdi represents a
modern approach favoring a high degree of perception deference and a low
degree of means deference, it seems plausible that an emergency constitution
already exists that gives the government wide latitude to perceive threats in
national emergency contexts but still preserves a core of judicial inquiry to
prevent unnecessary deprivations of liberty.
2. Desirability ofAllowing Extralegal Acts
This Note's conclusion also has implications for the debate over whether
openly extralegal actions by government decisionmakers should be permissible
during national emergencies. Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu was an
important forerunner of the current debate. It anticipated the essence of
current arguments by stating that judges should not pretend to exercise judicial
review over government actions responding to national emergencies because
any review would be inherently inadequate 44 and by arguing that "[i]f we
cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort
the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient.""4 The
242. See supra Section II.D.
243. See Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, supra note 1, at io44.
244. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 244.
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combination of both statements suggests that Justice Jackson perceived that
government decisionmakers could perform extralegal actions without any
judicial checks during national emergencies.
Modern proponents of acknowledging extraordinary actions as extralegal
go somewhat further than Justice Jackson's dissent. 46 They argue that
government decisionmakers should exercise emergency powers in an openly
extralegal way so that society understands the actions are extraordinary rather
than rationalize unlawful actions under the Constitution.147 To prevent abuses,
this position argues that government officials should have to acknowledge
openly and publicly that their actions are extralegal to remain accountable to
the public,4 8  and must limit extralegal actions to extraordinary
circumstances.) 9 A central assumption for the extralegal position is that courts
have historically proven incapable of constraining government decisionmakers'
actions during emergencies,50 a premise paralleling Jackson's dissent in
Korematsu. In light of this premise, the extralegal position concludes that,
during national emergencies, courts should acknowledge that government
officials will inevitably take extralegal actions in such circumstances and refuse
to legitimize otherwise unlawful actions by pretending to exercise judicial
review. ' In short, the extralegal position argues that "[j]udges should refrain
from giving in to an understandable urge to make exercises of emergency
powers compatible with constitutional norms as the judges articulate them, to
avoid normalizing the exception." '' s
The role of deference in the Japanese-American cases has ambiguous
implications for this debate. On one hand, the Supreme Court deferred to the
government's choice of means, the more consequential form of deference as far
as civil liberties are concerned. The Supreme Court's high degree of means
deference, if practiced in other national emergencies, suggests that Justice
Jackson may have been correct that judicial review during national emergencies
is inherently inadequate." 3 Because of its inadequacy, the Supreme Court's
246. See Cole, supra note 12, at 2586.
247. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 17, at 1133-34; Tushnet, supra note 34, at 306. But cf. Koh, supra
note 7, at 29-30 (suggesting that fundamental human rights should constrain the
government's actions in response to the terrorist threat).
248. See Gross, supra note 17, at 1023.
249. See id. at 1134.
250. See Cole, supra note 12, at 2585 & n.1o3; Tushnet, supra note 34, at 287.
251. See Tushnet, supra note 34, at 299-300.
252. Id. at 307.
253. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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approach may favor allowing the government to perform extralegal actions to
the extent the Supreme Court did not meaningfully check government
overreaching in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
On the other hand, a colorable argument may be made that the Supreme
Court's low degree of perception deference sufficiently constrained
government actions during the Second World War. If that is true, then the
Japanese-American cases undermine the premise that courts have historically
failed to constrain government actions during emergencies. Nevertheless, this
argument is probably incorrect. While decisive in the extreme case of Endo, a
low degree of perception deference does not always significantly constrain
government decisionmaking. In the Japanese-American cases, judicial review
ended once the Supreme Court independently decided that the government's
perception of a threat was correct. Such an approach may not be normatively
appropriate in the modern terrorism context.
Additionally, the Japanese-American cases refute a central assumption of
the extralegal position: government decisionmakers' willingness to
acknowledge when they act unlawfully. In Endo, the government attempted to
justify the ongoing internment of Japanese-Americans known to be loyal
within the existing constitutional structure." 4 The ease with which the
Supreme Court rejected the government's argument after the government
conceded that Endo was loyal"' suggests that proponents of allowing
extralegal actions are wrong to assume that government decisionmakers would
openly declare their actions to be extralegal if they could do so. The fact that
the government contested the lawfulness of detaining an admittedly loyal
citizen implies that either it misunderstood the boundaries of its power during
the war or it knowingly sought to validate an extralegal action in the existing
constitutional framework. This suggests that the government may have trouble
perceiving or may knowingly distort the line between legal and extralegal
actions. Given the government's position in Endo, a fairly straightforward case,
the premise that government decisionmakers would acknowledge when they
act unlawfully in the future is dubious.
254. Expare Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 295-96 (1944) (noting the military's argument that the ongoing
internment of loyal Japanese-Americans was a necessary component of its evacuation
policy); Brief for the United States, supra note 165, at 82 (defending the detention as
constitutional).
ass. Endo, 323 U.S. at 302 (concluding that a loyal citizen, by definition, poses no threat of




What, then, is the disaster of the Japanese-American cases? Descriptively,
the disaster is that the role of judicial deference remains fundamentally
misunderstood in these important examples of the Supreme Court's national
emergency jurisprudence. Because of the heightened importance of these cases
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September ii, 2001, as sources of
lessons for how courts should review the government's actions to address the
terrorism threat,2"6 there is a pressing need to assess accurately the role
deference played.
There should be three parameters to ensure that prospective normative
prescriptions of the lessons of the Japanese-American cases rest on a sound
foundation. First, an accurate descriptive analysis of the role of judicial
deference requires understanding Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo on their
own terms. That means devising a theory that explains judicial deference in all
three cases without overvaluing Hirabayashi or Korematsu, or undervaluing
Endo. Second, the descriptive analysis should have a nuanced conception of
deference that acknowledges that the degree of deference can differ based on
the aspects of decisionmaking under review and should express that conception
through an analysis that does more than merely provide an overall assessment
of degree or state whether or not deference is present. Third, the descriptive
analysis should be cautious about generalizing based solely on the Japanese-
American cases how judicial deference does or does not occur in national
emergency contexts. The degrees and forms of judicial deference are not static.
The Supreme Court that refused to reach an independent conclusion
concerning the government's choice of means in Hirabayashi and Korematsu is
not the same Supreme Court that critically reviewed the government's choice
of means in Hamdi.2 s7 If a prescription fails to fulfill all three parameters, its
author should explain why not in order to move the debate forward.
256. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, The Japanese American Cases, 1942-2004: A Social History, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 20o5, at 159; Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy
Combatants in the Internment's Shadow, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2oo5, at 255; Eric L.
Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment's True Legacy, OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 103 (2003); cf Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, supra note i, at 1043
("Korematsu has never been formally overruled, a fact that has begun to matter after
September 11. Even today, the case remains under a cloud. It is bad law, very bad law, very,
very bad law. But what will we say after another terrorist attack? More precisely, what will
the Supreme Court say if Arab Americans are herded into concentration camps? Are we
certain any longer that the wartime precedent of Korematsu will not be extended to the 'war
on terrorism'?").
257. See supra Section II.C.
